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This thesis is an investigation to identify whether
sufficient efforts are being taken to provide the highest
possible safety in petroleum movement. Current practices and
on-going initiatives for spill prevention and cleanup are
identified. From these efforts, overall trends in spills have
been identified. The small percentage of oil spilled,
compared to the amount transferred is examined; in addition,
long term impact on the environment is analyzed. It is
concluded that oil spills are inevitable no matter how much
effort is exerted; they are a part of petroleum movements.
However, due to the concerted efforts by industry and
government, spills should continue to decline via better
prevention, and those spills that do occur will be cleaned up
more promptly, with less environmental impact. The author
recommends that efforts for oil spill reduction need to
continue and require constant management attention. In
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The safety of petroleum movement: Is enough being done to
protect the environment? How many spills are too many? How
much effort can we (or do we) expect in order to preclude
spill incidents? How much effort is necessary to ensure these
undesirable events do not occur? Of course, we all would hope
for zero spills, but is this attainable? A more appropriate
question is, are concerted efforts being made to reduce oil
spills and their impact on the environment, and are these
efforts providing overall downward trends?
This paper will identify the U.S. government and
industrial initiatives that are occurring to reduce the oil
spill count and impact. The current identified causes,
sources and developing oil spill trends will be discussed; in
addition, the paper will compare the size versus the quantity
of spills. With these statistics, problem areas can be
identified and trends analyzed to show oil spill patterns.
The small percentage of spillage in comparison to total
volume transported will be analyzed. In addition, the
misperception of where the majority of oil spills comes from
will be reviewed; i.e., are tanker accidents or
industries/municipalities, which might be continually
"dripping" parts per million (ppm) of oil particles into the
water, the major cause of oil pollution?
The overall impact of spilled oil in nature will be
reviewed; do both nature and man contribute to the
introduction and removal of oil? Are natural processes
occurring each and every day degrading petroleum hydrocarbons?
Impact of the recently signed Oil Pollution Act of 1990
will be analyzed in depth. A cost /benefit analysis of the
Act, to determine the impacts on industry (in addition to
society and government) will be included. The opportunity
costs and intangible benefits as a result of the Act will be
addressed, in addition to a effectiveness evaluation.
Potential alternatives also will be provided for consideration
in spill reduction.
In summary, this paper will analyze the current oil spill
situation to identify trends and provide statistics, enabling
one to appropriately evaluate whether, given man's present
capabilities (both technological and economical), enough is
being done to protect the environment. The overall intent of
this paper is to put the oil spill picture into a realistic
perspective.
B. PURPOSE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
When a major oil spill accident occurs, the public is
informed: front page news is the norm. There is no doubt that
major oil spills are undesirable and have immediate impacts on
the environment and man. But, the "big picture" needs to be
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assessed. What portion of all oil annually "dumped" into the
water is accounted for by each individual spill: what ultimate
impact will it have on both the environment and man? Putting
spills into a proper perspective is critical, and this is the
purpose of this paper.
The following limitations will be observed during this
study:
1. Statistics provided by the U.S. Coast Guard and other
sources are restricted by the information provided to them and
the availability of current data.
2. Studies that are not performed annually, but rather a
several-years basis, will provide overall trend statistics but
do not provide any additional, more frequent "snapshots" of
the data.
3. New developments occurring are restricted to published
material of efforts being made. Unavailable, undisclosed
technologies which industry and the government may be
developing could also provide an additional (and currently not
assessed) impact on the spill scene in years to come.
4. Statistics for potential future oil spill reductions
(for example, the result of the double hull requirement by the
year 2010 from the Oil Pollution Act of 1990) are only
estimates, based on historical data, which cannot be fine-
tuned to a great degree.
For the purpose of this study, the following assumptions
will be made:




Industry and government activities will continue
reduction efforts, in conjunction with new government
regulations, to reduce potential oil spill costs as much as
feasible.
3. The U.S. Government will continue to seek the most
productive means (for both industry and the government) of
monitoring industry and government facilities, and provide
efficient/effective legislation for reducing spills as much as
is technologically and economically credible.
C. MAJOR DATA SOURCES
The primary source of statistics for trends, sources,
causes and general areas of spills is the U.S. Coast Guard.
In addition, close liaison with several organizations,
including the Pacific Strike Team (Navato, CA) , the Oil Spill
Response Team (Alameda, CA) , and the Clean Bay Oil Spill
Cooperative (Concord, CA) provided critical oil spill
information. Finally, the Coast Guard Research and
Development Center (Groton, CT) and the Naval Facilities
Engineering Command, in conjunction with resources (i.e.,
periodicals) available locally provided information on oil
spills, their prevention/cleanup, and technological programs
under development.
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows:
1. Chapter II provides background on prevention methods and
cleanup procedures. Information on the impact of oil on
nature also will be included.
2. Chapter III describes the sources, general areas and
causes of spills. Utilizing statistics provided from the U.S.
Coast Guard for each of these areas, this chapter will
identify problem areas, or the reduction thereof, and where
emphasis should be concentrated.
3. Chapter IV will utilize the statistics from Chapter III
and present overall trends for the oil spill categories in
both quantity (gallons) and number. An analysis and
interpretation of the statistics will also be provided.
4. Chapter V will identify initiatives being explored by
both industry and government to reduce oil spills. It
includes prevention and cleanup technological developments.
5. Chapter VI will analyze the Oil Pollution Act of 1990,
providing a cost/benefit analysis and effectiveness
evaluation. The impacts on industry, the government and
society will be examined, and opportunity costs and intangible
benefits will be identified.
6. Chapter VII will contain the conclusions and recommenda-
tions.
II. BACKGROUND
This chapter provides a comprehensive introduction to the
properties of oil and their impacts on nature. Natural
processes that affect oil are discussed, in addition to an
overview of the sources of spills by man. Background
information on types of spills, their cleanup and methods of
prevention are addressed, in addition to spill
characteristics, where spills can be expected, and the current
fundamental procedures of cleanup and prevention. Later
chapters will identify new innovations being developed to
reduce spill incidents further.
A. INTRODUCTION
Oil enters the environment from both natural phenomena and
man's activities. It has been observed that "seeps and
erosion of geological sediments contribute petroleum
hydrocarbons (oil) to the environment through natural
processes" [Ref. l:p. 2]. Man also releases oil in numerous
ways, including accidental spills and "long term, low-level
discharges associated with municipal and industrial wastes,
petroleum production, and transportation activities" [Ref.
l:p. 2]. Finally, it has been noted that "organisms living in
the sea also produce hydrocarbons through natural biological
processes..." [Ref. l:p. 2].
What is also of interest is that both nature and man
contribute to "its (oil) removal or its dispersal into
innocuous concentrations..." "Natural processes - physical,
biological and chemical - degrade petroleum hydrocarbons"
[Ref. l:p 2]. As is well known, man contains and recovers
spilled oil to the best of his capabilities.
Petroleum is "not a substance foreign to the marine
environment. . .natural seeps have been discharging petroleum
hydrocarbons into the marine environment for millions of
years, in amounts substantially greater than those resulting,
for instance, from present-day offshore production activities"
[Ref. l:p. 3]. To date, about "200 submarine oil seeps have
been identified around the world. . .petroleum has continuously
entered the seas as a result of the erosion of uplifted
sedimentary rocks containing trace amounts of petroleum
hydrocarbons" [Ref. l:p. 3].
Of note is the fact that "most surface and near-surface
open ocean water contain petroleum hydrocarbons in the range
of about 1 to 10 parts per billion (ppb) ,.. .deeper open ocean
waters... are 1 ppb or less... (and) coastal waters. . .show
higher ... levels. . .up to 100 ppb" [Ref. l:p. 3]. However,
these levels "appear to have little, if any, toxic effect on
marine life. . .concentrations from 10 to 100 times greater than
coastal waters are required before measurable effects on
marine organisms can be detected" [Ref. l:p. 3].
Many different processes act on a spill that impact its
cleanup or removal. Evaporation is a primary process; it is
"responsible for the loss of up to 500 percent of a surface
oil slick's volume..." [Ref. l:p. 6]. Of critical
significance to marine life, is that "benzene, toluene, and
xylenes, which are rapidly lost through evaporation, are among
the most toxic components in oil" [Ref. l:p. 6].
Consequently, this drastically reduces the impacts of oil on
ocean life forms. Some organisms "ingest dispersed oil
droplets. . .bacteria, yeast, and fungi (are) capable of
metabolizing and chemically degrading petroleum
hydrocarbons..." [Ref. l:p. 9]. Photo-oxidation, in which oil
films oxidize, also occurs. In fact, "40 barrels spread over
a square mile could be degraded in a few days by photo-
oxidation" [Ref. l:p. 9].
In addition, three facts of importance have been exposed
through research:
-there has been no apparent irrevocable damage to
marine sources on a broad scale by either chronic
inputs of oil or occasional major oil spills...
-where oil has had an effect, . . .monitoring has
shown. . .biological recovery ... (which can take weeks,
months or years, depending on the spill and its
location)
-there is no evidence. . .of a deleterious impact on
human health from releases of petroleum into the marine
environment. [Ref. l:p. 9]
Oil enters the water from many different sources
controlled by man. Of critical note is that only 12.5 percent
of oil spilled is from tanker accidents, while 31.3 percent is
from industrial and municipal wastewater discharges and run-
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off. Natural seeps and erosion account for approximately 8
percent of oil in the sea, and atmospheric fallout (from trace
amounts of petroleum which have evaporated into the
atmosphere) accounts for almost 10 percent. Refinery
wastewater, offshore oil production and other transportation
operations account for the remainder [Ref. l:p. 2]. All this
is important to realize, because when one first thinks of an
oil spill, one usually thinks of a tanker accident. Such
accidents only account for about one-eighth of all spills
[Ref. l:p. 2] (see Figure 1).
B. TYPES OF SPILLS AND THEIR CLEANUP
Any place oil is stored, transferred or shipped, there is
a potential for a spill. Spills occur in pipelines, hoses,
valves, and loading arms. Ruptured tanks, barges, and tankers
are not unheard of. Fuel movements by rail or truck also pose
risks for spills.
Spills occur on land, harbor areas, rivers, lakes and the
open ocean. "Spills of petroleum products on land rank with
beach areas as the most difficult, time consuming and
expensive spills to effectively clean up" [Ref. 2:pp. 3-103].
The main concern is the "leaching of the product to a ground
water supply" [Ref. 2:pp. 3-17]. Consequently, spills
occurring in harbor areas, rivers, and lakes need to be
prevented from reaching the shoreline, due to the high cost








Sources of Spilled Oil (By Volume)
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(although "snow is a good sorbent" [Ref. 2: pp. 3-107] allowing
for easy disposal) . Spills spread until they are contained,
broken up (i.e., by wave action) or evaporate (only the less
viscous products or components evaporate) . Small spills are
typically not a serious threat. However, large spills of the
magnitude of the Exxon Valdez or the Persian Gulf conflict
necessitate massive cleanup efforts.
The first priority when confronting an oil spill is to
"make all possible efforts to limit the spread of the oil
mass" [Ref. 2: pp. 3-36]. Cleanup equipment needs to be
readily available, so as to be promptly on-scene. Equipment
includes skimmers, booms, and tow assemblies. Personnel need
to be well trained and be equipped with effective
communication capabilities.
Oil slicks move at the speed of the local surface current
and at approximately three percent of the wind velocity [Ref.
2:pp. 3-89]. Consequently, prompt deployment of boom, skimmer
and utility boats to enclose the spill and protect the
shorelines cannot be overemphasized. Whenever possible, booms
should be deployed in such a way that "skimmers can be located
downwind" [Ref. 2:pp. 3-89] of the slick. Water jets from
utility boats or from pierside fire trucks can be utilized to
direct the slick into a skimmer for retrieval and away from
shorelines. Also, "since oil does not adhere well to wet
surfaces. . .hose down rocky areas before the arrival of an oil
slick" [Ref. 2:pp. 3-101]; this can aid substantially in the
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cleanup process. A "less desirable approach is to use a hot,
high pressure (120 degree Fahrenheit, 1200 psi) water jet... to
loosen oil adhering to rocks and push it back in the water to
be picked up by skimmers" [Ref. 2: pp. 3-103].
In cleaning oil from fast current rivers and tidal areas,
the first step is to "divert the oil out of the fast current
into areas of low current" [Ref. 2:p 3-103].
Cleanup of land spills includes the use of vacuum trucks
and sorbent pads with the proper disposal of oil-soaked soil.
In summary, oil spills occur quickly and without notice.
It has been estimated that it costs about "$6.50 to cleanup
one gallon of oil" [Ref. 2:p. 3-2]. Consequently, prompt,
effective cleanup capabilities, especially the basic
procedures described in this section, need to be in-place
wherever a spill is capable of occurring to reduce the full
potential of damage from the spill as much as possible.
C. METHODS OF PREVENTION
"Prevention is not only far more important than all the
skimmers and floating booms, it is cheaper, too" [Ref. 2:p. 3-
2]. Prevention is a key aspect of fighting oil spills. It
includes having adequate containment to prevent the oil from
reaching navigable waters; examples are dikes, berms, curbing,
and retaining walls (all impervious to oil).
Tanks, including supports and foundations need to have
"integrity testing. . .using hydrostatic testing, visual
inspection or a system of non-destructive shell thickness
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testing" [Ref. 2:pp. 3-53]. Consideration should be given to
having one or more of the following: high liquid level alarm,
high liquid level pump cut-off devices and/or a fast response
system for determining the liquid level [Ref. 2:pp. 3-25-3-
26]. "Buried piping installations should have protective
wrapping and coating and be cathodically protected if soil
conditions warrant. . .pipe supports should be properly designed
to minimize abrasion and corrosion and allow for expansion and
contraction" [Ref. 2:p. 3-26].
All above-ground tanks, valves, and pipelines require
frequent visual examination and should be clearly marked to
prevent misalignment during oil transfer operations [Ref. 2:p.
3-31]. Hose assemblies require a minimum bursting pressure of
600 pounds per square inch, and they need to be properly
marked, identifying product, last test date and pressure [Ref.
2: p. 3-7].
Hoses need to also be supported "in a manner that prevents
strain on couplings" [Ref. 2:p. 3-14]. Loading arms, which
are used to load and offload fuel from vessels, must meet
specific testing requirements and have some means of draining
or being closed before disconnecting after transfer of oil
[Ref. 2:p. 3-9].
Additional prevention measures include emergency shut down
capabilities, adequate lighting, and communication.
All of these fundamental prevention measures assist in
keeping the spill count and volume to a minimum. As
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additional industrial and government initiatives occur (these
will be discussed in later chapters) oil spill incidents
should decrease even more. The significance of new methods of
prevention cannot be overemphasized. They can have a
tremendous impact on reducing the amount of oil spilled and
its associated high cleanup cost.
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III. SOURCES, GENERAL AREAS, AND CAUSES OF SPILLS
In this section, oil spills will be analyzed from a
variety of aspects. Data accumulated on sources of oil spills
will provide information on the place from which the oil spill
comes from; i.e., from land vehicles, vessels or facilities.
The general area of spills will be examined, providing
statistics on significant locations where oil spills have
occurred; i.e., inland, the Atlantic Ocean, the Pacific Ocean
and the Gulf of Mexico. In addition, another critical aspect
of oil spills is their cause. By examining this aspect of oil
spills, the most prevalent reasons for the spills can be
determined and provide areas for future work.
A. SPILL SOURCES
The sources of oil spills will be scrutinized first.
Statistics provided by the U.S. Coast Guard reflect a
decreasing percentage of oil spills in both the land vehicles
and facilities categories while the number of spills resulting
from vessels has been steadily increasing. In 1982,
approximately 49% of all oil spills (number of incidents) were
from facilities, and approximately 10% were from land
vehicles; the remaining 41% occurred from vessels [Ref . 3:p.
9]. In 1984, facility spills accumulated about 45%, vessels
had 44% and the remainder was from land vehicles; in 1986, 54%
were a result of vessel spills, about 7% were from land
15
vehicles and 39% were from facilities [Ref. 3:p. 9], From
these statistics (see Table I) , one notes the decline in
TABLE I











FACILITIES 49 5390 45 5625 39 2925
LAND
VEHICLES 10 1100 11 1375 7 525
VESSELS 41 4510 44 5500 54 4050
TOTALS 100 11,000 100 12,500 100 7,500
•Numbers are approximate figures
facility spills' percentages and the slowly increasing
percentage of oil spills from vessels in recent years. In
addition, oil spills, by volume , had a similar pattern between
the years 1982-1986. In 1982, roughly 65% of the volume of
the spills were from facilities, 30% from vessels, and 5% from
land vehicles; in 1984, 42% resulted from facilities, 54% from
vessels and 4% from land vehicles; and for 1986, about 69% of
spills were from vessels, with 30% from facilities and
approximately 1% from land vehicles [Ref. 3:p. 9] [Ref.
4: Attachment 1, p. 1] (see Table II).
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TABLE II




% Volume % Volume % Volume
FACILITIES 65 6,763,020 42 6,827,089 30 1,400,533
LAND
VEHICLES 5 520,232 4 650,199 1 46,684
VESSELS 30 3,121,394 54 8,777,686 69 3,221,224
TOTALS 100 10,404,646 100 16,254,974 100 4,668,441
These statistics appear to reflect (as shown in Figures 2
and 3) an improved awareness in recent years at the facilities
and land vehicles, and identify the need to more closely




Similar conclusions can be reached by analyzing the
general areas of spills. In 1984, 21% of oil spills (by
number of incidents) occurred inland, (i.e., rivers, lakes, on
land) while 59% occurred on the oceans (21% in the Atlantic
Ocean, 21% in the Gulf of Mexico and 17% in the Pacific) ; the
remaining percentage was not identified [Ref. 3:p. 14]. In
1985 the inland percentage was 19%, 56% was in the oceans, and
the remainder was not identified; in 1986, the inland
percentage dropped to 11%, while the oceans had 53% (19% in
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Pacific Ocean) ; again the remaining percentage was not
identified [Ref. 3:p. 14] (see Table III). These statistics
identify a need to monitor and place more attention on the
oceans, and their coasts, than the inlands.
TABLE III
GENERAL AREAS OF SPILLS (%)*
AREA 1984 1985 1986














*Remaining percentage is not identified by the U.S. Coast Guard
Another dimension for analyzing the oil pollution
incidents by location includes comparing the water territory
for the spills. River channels, encompassing 31% of the
number of spill incidents in 1984, retained a high percentage
in 1985 (30%) and 1986 (29%) [Ref. 3:p. 16] (see Table IV).
Also, of interest is the fact that in 1984, 25% of spills
measured in gallons occurred in river channels and this grew
to 47% in 1986 [Ref. 3:p. 17]. These statistics reflect a
need for more attention to be placed in the river channel
locations. Of importance is the fact that ports and harbors
reduced from 21% in 1984 to 16% in 1985 and to 7% in 1986; the
territorial seas (shore-3 miles) reduced from 21% in 1984 to
20% in 1985 to 9% in 1986; the remaining percentages included
open sheltered, contiguous zone (3-12 miles) , high seas (12
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miles or more), and that which was not identified [Ref. 3:p.
16] (see Table IV) . These statistics identify the attention
being placed in the ports and harbors and the territorial
waters.
A detailed analysis of the origin of spills provided
further information on oil incident statistics. Table V shows
the relative percentages. Between 1984-1986, oil spills from
tank ships and tank barges rose in quantity (from 11% to 26.2%
for ships and from 15.3% to 42.4% for barges) [Ref. 3: pp.
47,49]. This identifies a need for attention in this oil
spill area. Most all other areas had a decline for this time
period, i.e., bulk storage reduced from 9% to 7.9%, land
vehicles reduced from 1.7% to .8%, rail reduced from .5% to
negligible, off-shore production remained at .3%, on-shore
production changed from .1% to .2% (a modest increase), bulk
TABLE IV
WATER TERRITORY OF SPILLS (%)
*
AREA 1984 1985 1986
RIVER CHANNELS 31 30 29
PORTS AND HARBORS 21 16 7
TERRITORIAL SEAS 21 20 9
OPEN SHELTERED 13 12 12
HIGH SEAS 9 6 **
CONTIGUOUS ZONE (3-12 MILES) 5 5 *•
'Remaining percentage not identified by the U.S. Coast Guard
**Not identified by the U.S. Coast Guard
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TABLE V
ORIGIN OF SPILLS (%)*
SPILL SOURCE 1984 1986
VESSELS
TANK SHIPS 11 26.2
TANK BARGES 15.3 42.2
DRY CARGO BARGES 0.0 0.0








BULK STORAGE 9.0 7.9
REFINERY 0.9 6.1
ON-SHORE PRODUCTION 0.1 0.2
OFF-SHORE PRODUCTION 0.3 0.3
OTHER 1.4 0.2
TRANS/RELATED PIPELINES 0.0 3.9
MARINE FACILITIES
FUEL TRANSFER 0.1 0.0
BULK TRANSFER 0.5 0.0
NON-BULK TRANSFER 0.0 0.0
OTHER 0.0 1.8
LAND FACILITIES 0.2 0.5
Remaining percentage not identified by the U.S. Coast Guard
transfer reduced from .5% to negligible [Ref.3:pp. 47,49].
These statistics appear to indicate an increased attention
having been placed in these areas.
C. SPILL CAUSES
Causes of spills are of great concern and are critical for
establishing problem areas. Table VI shows the relative





































Remaining percentage not identified by the U.S. Coast Guard
was from hull ruptures; in 1984, 19.4% (in quantity) of oil
spills were caused by hull rupture, while in 1986, 39.1% had
this cause [Ref. 3: pp. 51,53]. This sends a definite message
of where concentration needs to be directed. In addition,
tank rupture (i.e., at bulk storage facilities) also increased
from 5.2% in 1984 to 13.5% in 1986, as did valve failures,
(i.e., at ships, barges, bulk storage facilities) from 1% to
16.2%, and hose/load arm, (i. e., at bulk storage facilities)
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from .3% to 9.4% [Ref. 3: pp. 50,52]. Most other areas had a
decline: pipeline rupture/leak declined from 1.3% to 1%,
improper equipment operation did not change at 1.3%, personnel
error dropped from 7.4% to 1.5%, railroad/highway/air dropped
from 2.3% to .9%, tank overflow had a slight increase from
1.8% to 3.8%, equipment failure (including pumps and other
equipment) increased slightly from 1.2% to 1.3%, and natural
causes reduced from .2% to negligible [Ref. 3:pp. 50,52].
In summary, the most significant areas of concern are: the
oceans, (and their coasts), river channels, tank ships, barges
and hull ruptures. In addition, current efforts being
undertaken to reduce the spills in the above mentioned
categories also will be examined in a later section of this
paper.
In general, as the following statistics in this section
will reflect, oil spills have decreased in both volume
(millions of gallons) and in number. This is significant
because even though a category of an oil spill, as discussed
in the previous section, may have increased in percentage with
respect to a total of 100% for oil spills, a lower cumulative
total in number and quantity reflect an oil-conscious industry
that is making changes to reduce oil spills.
One overall oil spill trend identifies that the number of
total oil spills has decreased in number, from over 15,000 in
1978, to about 14,500 in 1979, to about 12,500 in 1980, to
about 12,000 in 1981, to about 11,000 in 1982, to about 12,400
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in 1983, to about 12,500 in 1984, to about 9,500 in 1985, to
about 7,500 in 1986 [Ref. 3:p. 9] (see Table VII and Figure
4) . In addition, two categories of spills have had the most
significant impact on this drop in total number of spills:
spills over 100 gallons (which dropped from about 2200 in 1982
to about 1000 in 1986) and spills that create only a sheen
(typically less than one gallon) which decreased from about
3500 in 1982 to about 1200 in 1986 [Ref. 3:p. 9]. Spills in
the 1-99 gallon range did not change substantially [Ref. 3:p.
9] (see Table VIII) . These statistics appear to reflect the
fact that more attention is being given to the prevention of
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TABLE VIII
OIL SPILL TRENDS (NUMBERS)*
SPILL SIZE 1982 1986
SPILLS OVER 100 GALLONS 2,200 1,000
SPILLS THAT CREATE A SHEEN 3,500 1,200
SPILLS: 1-99 GALLONS 4,800 4,900





Total Oil Spills (Number)
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In addition, the overall trend of quantity of oil spilled
has decreased. In 1984, over 16,250,000 gallons were spilled;
in 1985, over 18.5 million gallons; in 1986, about 4.7 million
gallons; in 1987, about 4.3 million gallons; and in
1988 about 6.6 million gallons were spilled [Ref. 4: Attachment
1, p. 1] (see Table IX and Figure 5). This is a positive
trend, and appears to identify an improved awareness and
effort to decrease oil spills.
Further statistical analysis identifies that, in 1984,
78.9% of the volume of all spills resulted from 18 spills over
100,000 gallons (for a total of over 12 million gallons) ; this
dropped to 2.75 million gallons (62.1%) for 12 spills over
100,000 gallons in 1986 [Ref. 3:pp. 53,55] (see Table X) .
This data also reflects the decline in major oil spills during
this time period.
TABLE IX
TOTAL VOLUME OF OIL SPILLS




















Total Volume Of Oil Spills (Millions of Gallons)
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TABLE X
STATISTICS FOR SPILLS OVER 100,000 GALLONS
CHARACTERISTIC 1984 1986
NUMBERS OF SPILLS 18 12
TOTAL GALLONS SPILLED 12,820,201 2,758,120
PERCENTAGE VOLUME OF ALL
SPILLS
78.9 62.1
Moreover, the overall number of reported oil spills from
barges, tankers, and all vessels has been declining "as a
percentage of total oil spills into water, which have also
been declining" [Ref. 5:p. 53]. It has been observed that
the number of barge spills exceeds tanker spills every year.
Of interest is the fact that, for "8 of 12 years the total
volume spilled from them (barges) exceeded the volume spilled
by tankers..." [Ref. 5:p. 53]. A significant note is the fact
that "oil spills per vessel have declined 45 percent in the
last 15 years..." [Ref. 5:p. 53].
In summary, the oil spills have decreased. The overall
lower cumulative totals for both the number of spills reflect
the concerted efforts of an oil-spill-conscious industry. As
will be discussed in later chapters, many initiatives are
underway to maintain these downwards trends. These efforts
should also provide better cleanup capability.
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IV. SAFETY AND THE REALITY OF OIL SPILLS
A. A REALISTIC PERSPECTIVE
As has been previously noted, industry performs regular
preventive maintenance on vessels, storage facilities, and
land vehicles and practices oil movement safety to keep spills
to a minimum. The overall downward trends reflect a concerned
industry, attempting to control the oil spill situation.
Realistically, the oil spill picture is not as dismal as some
media may depict.
To put the oil spill picture in a proper perspective, it
has been revealed that "one five-hundredths of one percent of
the total amount of oil moving through U.S. waters is spilled"
[Ref. 6:p. 15]. This is a very small percentage, and as Steve
Ricks, from the Clean Bay Oil Spill Cooperative (in Concord,
CA) stated: the amount of oil spilled in the Exxon Valdez
accident is equivalent to about three days of what normally
enters the water throughout the world by all means (i.e.,
industry, municipalities, erosion, seeps... as identified in
Chapter II)
.
The world uses over "60 million barrels of oil each
day... (3.5 trillion liters per year)... the oil spilled by the
Exxon Valdez amounts to 4/10 of 1 percent of the world's daily
use" [Ref. 7:p. 660]. In addition, "tankers had made nearly
9000 trips from Valdez with a accumulation of 6.7 billion
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barrels (281 billion gallons) oil in the past 11 years without
a major incident" [Ref. 8:p. 47]. For the Valdez spill, most
of the deaths of the sea birds and otters occurred shortly
after the spill; the "long-term injury to most wild-life and
marine organisms is expected to be minimal..." [Ref. 8:p. 62].
The potential for a major accidental spill such as from
the Exxon Valdez had a probability of "once in 241 years"
[Ref. 10:p. 68]. As a comparison, the Exxon Valdez spill of
March 1989 spilled about 240,000 barrels of crude (an
accident) while the spill in the Persian Gulf (1991) , called
the largest spill in history, has been estimated at six to
eight million barrels [Ref. 10:p. A6]. The latter was
definitely not an accident. One must keep in mind, as was
discussed in Chapter II, that oil is a naturally occurring
mineral product that does not contain "PCB's,
.
plutonium or
chlorine gas...". In addition, the earth recycles carbon and
carbon-based materials. In large quantities, they cause
serious disruption for a time, but there is no evidence that
they cause permanent damage" [Ref. 7:p. 660].
The "number of pollution-causing tanker accidents as
recorded by the U.S. Coast Guard has fallen over 50 percent
in the 1980s, suggesting that safety is improving" [Ref. 11 :p.
46] . These statistics are significant and merit attention;
they reflect the fact that significant efforts are being made
to decrease oil spills. As the pursuit of perfection in this
field continues, its goal of zero spills may never materialize
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(due to realistic technological and economic constraints) as
long as oil continues to be transported.
Moreover, more oil movement results in a higher potential
for spills. Today, more petroleum is being imported into the
U.S.; 33% came from overseas in 1973, while 46% came in 1990.
The U.S. has been producing oil for over 130 years and its
biggest and best oil fields are being pumped dry; it is also
unlikely more giant oil fields will be found in the United
States [Ref. 12:p. 38]. The need for research and development
to search for oil fields, and provide the highest capability
to preclude and cleanup spills must be continued, especially
because of this increased oil transportation/movement trend.
Oil spills must never take a "back-row" seat.
Although spills are a part of the oil industry, many
innovations, by both industry and government, are being
investigated and developed to reduce the risk of spills.
These developments are identified in the next chapter.
B . SAFETY
It has been observed that there has been "a declining rate
of vessel casualties, a declining rate of vessel losses as a
result of accidents, and a declining rate of personnel
injuries" [Ref. 5:p. 35]. These safety trends are significant
in light of the fact that during the same 20-year period, the
average crew size has declined substantially (from the "low
thirties to below twenties for U.S. flag vessels, and the high
teens for many foreign fleets)" [Ref. 5:p. 35]. Many advances
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have occurred to promote these trends: technology has
improved, operating procedures have been refined, and the
scrutiny of maritime operations by government and industry
bodies has increased" [Ref. 5:p. 35]. In addition "worldwide
casualty rates of large tank vessels have declined. .. (to) a
level roughly 20% below those of the mid to late 1970' s" [Ref.
5:p. 42]. For tankers, "total (vessel) losses have since (the
1970s) declined to half the prior levels, perhaps indicating
that safety measures adopted. . .are having the desired effect"
[Ref. 5:p. 45]. The tanker casualty rate, identified in
incidents per thousand tons, "marked declines of over... 50%
for tankers" (see Figure 6) [Ref. 5:p. 45]. In addition, in
the past years "injuries per million man-hours worked ... have
declined 50 percent", [Ref. 5:p. 54] and this has occurred
even though the number of employees has decreased per vessel.
The overall opinion of vessel operators is that safety has
improved aboard ships, even with smaller crews, because of
greater safety consciousness and improved equipment. "Crew
reductions require better trained personnel who are able to
accept more responsibility and to manage automated systems"
[Ref. 5:p. 60]. Of important note is that average working
hours do not need to increase, and fatigue can actually
decrease, if these smaller crew vessels are properly managed.
For example, because of automated power plants, the average
engine department has reduced from 8 to 5 personnel. Before
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automation, six of the eight were watchstanders, with an
average day of 11-1/2 hours; with automation, all 5 members
stand day watches, averaging 10-1/2 hour days, allowing for
all to work together as a team, and have the same meal and
recreation times [Ref. 5:p. 102].
The use of ergonomics in designing new systems can assist
in reducing fatigue, thus providing a potential to also
improve safety statistics [Ref. 5:p. 68]. In addition, the
use of "dead man" switches and alarm systems to "guard against
lapses in attention or sudden incapacitation" [Ref. 5:p. 88]
are very effective safeguards in the prevention of accidents.
Even with smaller crews, maintenance remains critical in
ensuring good shipboard safety. Newer materials and changes
in design have eliminated some routine work or made them
shipyard repair items. To perform maintenance, some companies
employ "riding crews" or employ firms to perform needed
maintenance in port. [Ref. 5:p. 63]
Reduced crew sizes result in less on-the-job training
opportunities onboard the vessel. Consequently, personnel
need to be well-trained prior to boarding the vessel. Some
companies have "instituted cadet programs to train unlicensed
personnel ... .others hire in excess of the normal compliment
until crew members gain the necessary experience" [Ref. 5:p.
65]. The recruiting of maritime academy graduates also occurs
to obtain better qualified personnel. Finally, many new
automated shipboard systems have "built-in capabilities for
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individual and team training which permit operators to
simulate training exercises and mentally rehearse typical and
atypical situations" [Ref. 5:p. 92]. In addition, courses
(some using simulators) in ship handling, stress and team
management, technical engineering competence and oil spill
cleanup and containment are utilized at union-run schools and
at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy [Ref. 5:pp. 99-100].
To promote safety and identify the impact of reduced
manning on the social environment, psychologists have been
used to clarify the situation to crews by providing training
and counseling [Ref. 5:p. 80].
In addition, there is "no evidence to suggest that drug
and alcohol abuse has increased during the past 30 years"
[Ref. 5:p. 84] even while crew size has decreased. In 1988,
the Coast Guard issued the "Programs for Chemical Testing of
Commercial Vessel Personnel" (CGD 86-067), requiring employers
to have drug and alcohol control programs, including "testing
before employment, after accidents, and under other specified
conditions" [Ref. 5:p. 84]. Regulations "prohibit a crew
member's standing watch if he or she has consumed alcohol
within the previous 4 hours... (in addition), companies
are. . .required to have alcohol test kits on board, with
personnel trained in their use" [Ref. 5:p. 84], to test the
crew as deemed necessary. Because, small crews imply "greater
mutual dependence for safe operation, peer pressure to be
sober and fit for duty" [Ref. 5:p. 89] is stronger.
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In summary, with appropriate training, organizational
innovations, and ergonomic design, new vessel technology will
not degrade safety. In fact, these efforts can "reduce the
potential problems of stress, fatigue and boredom" [Ref . 5:p.
103]. As a result, this can only increase the safety aspects
of the vessel. Moreover, safety is of utmost importance to
vessels in reducing the potential for spills. With technology
and safety improving, spill reduction can be expected to
continue.
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V. OIL SPILL INITIATIVES FOR PREVENTION AND CLEANUP
A. INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT EFFORTS
Many new developments have occurred and others are being
investigated to reduce the number and volume of spills, in
addition to providing a more efficient and effective cleanup
capability. These efforts are wide and varied and will be
discussed in detail in this section. Programs such as Strike
Teams and Oil Spill Cooperatives will also be examined to
assess their potential impact on spills.
Research and testing is a regular occurrence in the oil
spill prevention and cleanup areas. Some new developments
include: Du Pont recently unveiled a "composite liner system
for cargo tanks to prevent spillage if the outer metal hull is
penetrated" [Ref. 13:p. 16]. M.H. Systems, of Del Mar,
California, has discussed a "retrofit system for tankers to
limit spillage to the volume below the line rupture" [Ref.
13:p. 16]. The Swedish National Maritime Administration has
proposed a "system for pressure/vacuum relief valves to
minimize escape of oil from damaged cargo tanks" [Ref. 13 :p.
16]. Automated Response Systems has proposed a "water filled
buffer bag retrofitted in the bottom of cargo tanks" [Ref.
13:p. 16]]. Ocean Clean, Inc., has disclosed "plans for a
ship mounted system to recover oil and store it in a flexible,
floating bag" [Ref. 13:p. 16].
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Shell Oil and Crowley Maritime recently developed a "self-
contained oil spill contingency barge. . .which could (in
theory) have contained, removed and stored 30% of the crude
oil which flowed out of the stricken ship" (Exxon Valdez )
[Ref. 14:p. 89]. This barge represents the "leading edge in
mobile oil-recovery capability" [Ref. 14:p. 89]. It was used
in the summer of 1990 as a key element of the spill
contingency plan during "exploratory drilling in the Chukchi
Sea" [Ref. 14:p. 89]. Its large size offers stability at sea.
It has "significant below-deck liquid storage, deck stowage
for spill-response vessels and adequate room for mobile crane
operations and boom deployment" [Ref. 14:p. 89].
The Navy has recently procured newly developed Crowley
Environmental-Alden Industries Model A-4 skimmers which are to
be used to cleanup spills less than 200 gallons [Ref. 15 :p.
1] . They are most useful near "piers, berthed ships, ditches,
ponds, and shore areas with water depths of less than 4 feet"
[Ref. 15:p. 1]. A skimmer is lightweight and compact (it fits
into a pick-up truck) , can be used in harbor chop up to one
foot, and is capable of being operated unattended [Ref. 15 :p.
2].
A vacuum tank system is being researched which could
"significantly reduce the volume of oil escaping in a
grounding" [Ref. 16: p. 42]. When the bottom of a ship is
opened, there is an outflow of oil, creating an under-
pressure. If a "vacuum is created by valves on the top of the
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tank, this under-pressure would reduce the outflow because a
hydrostatic balance would result" [Ref. 16:p. 42].
A new sensor package has recently been mounted to the HU-
25B (U.S. Coast Guard aircraft) which is a "valuable asset in
tracking oil spills along the U.S. coastlines" [Ref. 17 :p.
36]. It has been used for identifying areas with an "oil
thickness of greater than 2 micrometers" [Ref. 17:p. 56].
At Leonardo, New Jersey, Minerals Management Service is
completing an oil spill test site (currently scheduled for
completion in 1991) to improve spill cleanup capabilities in
the United States. It has a "675 ft. by 65 ft. open air tank
11 feet deep that can hold 2.6 million gallons of salt water
and simulate a range of sea conditions.
.. (it) allows
evaluation of equipment to detect, monitor, and cleanup spills
[Ref. 18:p. 30].
Research in bioremediation is showing increased promise in
assisting spill cleanup. A "controlled demonstration...
showed microbes reduced oil concentration by 99.99% in a
column of sea water" [Ref. 19:p. 20]. They can penetrate
"depths of as much as 2 ft. . .to degrade subsurface oil" [Ref.
3:p. 20]
.
Another recent advance in cleanup techniques includes a
"boom that can skim oil while also containing it" [Ref. 20 :p.
1] . An emergency seal for leaking fuel containers has also
been developed. It "forms an immediate seal to
control. . .leaks and spills" [Ref. 21:p. 1]. The combination
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of a "high water absorption polymer in a bentonite base
absorbs over 300 times its own weight in water and produces an
effective seal against leaking fuels" [Ref. 21 :p. 2]. It can
stop leaks from "small slits to large holes on jagged,
crumpled dirty surfaces. . .no surface preparation is necessary
even though a liquid is flowing around the hole" [Ref. 21 :p.
3]. In addition, a new ultrasonic "pig" has been developed
that can take 255 pipeline soundings for each 15 mm of forward
travel. This translates into 27 million readings for each
mile of pipeline to identify the pipewall thickness [Ref. 22:
p. 68]. This can enhance spill prevention on pipelines
immensely.
Mammoth oil skimmers are being developed with 38,000
gallon-per-minute pumps. "Thirty-six feet in diameter,
weighing eighty tons, it would stand high above the sea on a
pair of 260-foot submerged pontoons. Although quite expensive
(at $35 million), it would be cost effective, considering the
Valdez incident cost over $1 billion to date" [Ref. 23:p. 58].
In addition, sanitizer machines are being used that "sweep
up sand and shake it through a filter that separates oil
traces and tar balls from the sand and redeposits the sand"
[Ref. 24 :p. 24]. Disker machines are also utilized for
cleanup; they turn the sand and expose any oil remnants to
oxygen and sunlight, forming tar balls that can be picked up
with rakes or shovels [Ref. 24 :p. 24].
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The U.S. Congress also has demonstrated its concern for
oil spill incidents. It recently passed the Oil Pollution Act
of 1990 which includes many significant new spill measures,
one of the most significant is the requirement for double
hulls on tankers by the year 2010 (with a few minor
exceptions). An in-depth cost/benefit analysis and
effectiveness evaluation will be provided in the next chapter.
An assessment of how this government initiative is anticipated
to reduce oil spills in future years will also be addressed.
Plans are currently being developed for the world's
largest oil spill response network. The Marine Spill Response
Corporation (MSRC), an independent, not-for-profit
organization" [Ref 25 :p. 1] will have an enormous spill
cleanup capability. The MSRC will "consist of a Washington
D.C. headquarters and five response centers located in the New
York-New Jersey (area), Florida, Louisiana, Port Hueneme, CA,
and Seattle" [Ref. 20 : Attachment 2, p. 1], The MSRC will have
"state-of-the-art equipment and will be able to combat
catastrophic spills throughout the tidal and offshore waters
of the United States" [Ref. 20: Attachment 3, p. 1]. It is
planned to be fully operational in 30 months (from September
1990), and can also be used to assist in smaller spills
whenever the Coast Guard determines that local response
capabilities are inadequate [Ref. 20:Attachment 3, pp. 1,6].
In addition to current initiatives, such as the MSRC,
existing oil spill cleanup facilities, such as Oil Spill
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Cooperative and Government Strike Teams are quite capable of
cleaning spills of all types.
1. National Strike Force
The Pacific Area Strike Team, located in Novato,
California and the Atlantic Area Strike Team, located in
Mobile, Alabama, comprise the Coast Guard National Strike
Force. The two Teams respond to major oil pollution
incidents, provide training, develop cleanup and protection
strategies, monitor contractor performance, and draft site
safety plans [Ref. 26;lp. 2].
The Coast Guard does not allow unnecessary
interference with private enterprise, therefore the "National
Strike Force equipment is only used when equivalent commercial
equipment is unavailable or insufficient to meet the specific
needs of the situation" [Ref. 26:p. 2].
Each team has its designated boundaries. The Pacific
Strike Team is "responsible for responding in 12 states in the
western portion of the continental U.S., Alaska, Hawaii, and
the Trust Territories of the Pacific. . .the Atlantic Strike
Team. . .covers the 36 states in the East, South, and Midwestern
U.S., the Caribbean, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands"
[Ref. 26:p. 4].
Both Strike Teams have vast resources of cleanup
equipment. The Pacific Strike Team has 14 skimmers and
numerous drocone barges (a flexible rubber bladder used to
carry petroleum or other liquids) with capacities up to
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246,000 gallons. They have two Mobile Command Posts, equipped
with a conference room, sleeping accommodations, advanced
communication systems, and are C-130 air deliverable.
Skimming barriers (over 600 feet in length) , flatbed trailers,
tractors, small boats, pumps, absorbent and support equipment
are well maintained, in large supply and ready for response
[Ref. 26:pp. 12-20]. Most equipment of the Strike Teams is
air deployable.
The Pacific Strike Team has assisted in the following
oil spill incidents: the Exxon Valdez (1989-240,000 bbl) , the
American Trader (1989-500,000 gal), the Puerto Rican (1941-
200,000 bbl) the Mega Bora (1990-90,000 bbl), and the Chevron
Hawaii explosion (1979-10,000 bbl). Since the Team was
established 18 years ago, they have been involved in
approximately 450 spills [LCDR Lucille (Pacific Strike Team
Executive Officer)/Lt B. Bialas conversation on 1 July 1991].
Clearly, the Strike Teams have impressive capabilities which
have been utilized effectively in numerous massive spills.
2. Clean Bay Oil Spill Cooperative
The Clean Bay Oil Spill Cooperative (also known as
"Clean Bay") is a "coalition of oil, chemical and pipeline
companies (i.e., Exxon Company, U.S.A., Chevron U.S.A. , Inc.,
Mobil Oil Corp. , Shell Oil Company, Southern Pacific Pipe
Lines, Inc..) ...(that) is ready to respond quickly and
effectively to virtually any situation involving spilled oil
or oil products" [Ref. 27:p. 2]. Their responsibility extends
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beyond the San Francisco Bay, covering over "340 miles of
California coastline - from as far north as Fort Bragg to Cape
San Francisco Martin in the South" [Ref. 27:p. 2]. Within
hours of a spill, the staff (headquartered in Concord,
California) can "mobilize over 300 trained individuals who, in
turn, will supervise up to 2,000 or more workers, depending on
the severity of the spill" [Ref. 27:p. 4]. Typically, the
first agency to be notified by the spiller is the Coast Guard,
who will coordinate the cleanup efforts. Clean Bay, if
assistance is requested, could then get involved as the
primary contractor.
Clean Bay is a non-profit oil spill cleanup network,
"owned by 17 companies. .
.
(and) is available to any responsible
party, member or non-member" [Ref. 28:p. 1]. Equipment owned
or on full-time charter has a "current value of $7
million.
.. (including) a 140 ft. oil spill response vessel, a
10,000 bbl oil storage barge,... 12 skimmers, .. .7
boats. . .31,000 feet of boom, ... 151, 000 gallons of
dispersant. . . and a dispersant spraying aircraft, (in addition
to) trailers and auxiliaries" [Ref. 28:p. 1] . "Four
helicopters, .. .20 vacuum trucks ,... four scrapers, four
frontend loaders. . .and tons of absorbents" [Ref. 27:p. 9] are
also available.
Clean Bay capabilities are not limited to spill
response. Other activities they are involved in include
training, maintenance, studies and lightering. Non-spill
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activities run approximately "$5.4 million per year and are
funded by members. . .spill cleanup costs are paid by the
spiller" [Ref. 28:p. 1]. Major spills that Clean Bay has
handled include: the Puerto Rican tanker explosion (1984 of
20,000 bbls) , the Shell Oil Spill (1088 of 9,000 bbls) and the
Oakland Estuary Spill (1973 of 4,000 bbls); they also
participated in the Exxon Valdez Spill (1989-of 240,000 bbls)
and the Mega Bora Spill (1990 of 90,000 bbls). Additional
cooperatives exist on the West Coast in Los Angeles, Santa
Barbara and Seattle, in addition to East Coast facilities,
each with immense oil spill cleanup potential [Steve Ricks
(Clean Bay Manager)/Lt B. Bialas conversation on 2 July 1991].
As with the Strike Teams, the industrial Oil Spill
Cooperatives have tremendous capabilities with a proven track
record.
B. ADDITIONAL ALTERNATIVES
As discussed, many initiatives by both government and
industry are currently in place. However, there also are
additional alternatives for spill reduction, which industry
and the government may need to place more emphasis on in the
future. For example, improved frames on vessels providing
better structural integrity may assist in spillage reduction.
Another option is to increase the number of oil-carrying
compartments by making each compartment smaller, thus
decreasing the potential amount spilled during a rupture. In
addition, more dredging may be required, to ensure adequate
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depths are maintained for vessels, to help ensure vessels do
not run aground. Also, improved rendering of locks, bridges,
and other structures would assist in spill reduction [Ref.
33:pp. 41,43,51]. "Situating new structures with greater
attention to the operational needs of waterway traffic would
also be an effective way to reduce accidents and, hence, the
possibility of oil spills" [Ref. 33:p. 51].
Each of theses alternatives would have an impact on oil
spill reduction and may need to be addressed further in future
years. As has been discussed, much already is ongoing for the
reduction of spills; however, the ever-present limiting
economical and technological factors must always be kept in




VI. OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990
The United States Congress has demonstrated its concern
about oil spill incidents by passing the Oil Pollution Act of
1990. This Act includes significant new spill measures. Due
to this Act, many costs and benefits will impact industry,
government and society; these impacts will be discussed in
this chapter. An effectiveness evaluation of the Act will be
included.
A. COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 has numerous requirements to
be implemented by both government and industry. The expected
costs and benefits are many. This section will discuss some
of the costs and benefits of the Act to industry, government
and society, placing particular emphasis on the new
requirement for double hulls, which this author feels is one
of the more significant required modifications of current
petroleum practices.
1. Benefits
Many benefits will result when the Oil Pollution Act
of 1990 is implemented in full. The conformance to all
sections of the Act should decrease future spills, resulting
in reduced cleanup costs, less product lost and reduced legal
expenses. In the long run, industry will obtain a better
public relations image, which is a intangible benefit.
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Of particular note are the benefits from the double-
hull requirement. The most critical is that it has been
estimated that double hulls would reduce the outflow from
rammings and groundings of single hulled vessels by about 45%,
and reduce the amount of outflow from collisions by about 30%
[Ref. 33:p. 32]. It has been assessed that double hulls would
provide "better protection against spills in minor, low energy
accidents. . . (and) provide only marginally better protection in
accidents resulting in large spills" [Ref. 33:p. 60].
For the government, full enforcement of the Act would
result in less impact to the environment and better control
over the oil industry and its pollution potential. In
addition, the U.S. would be seen by the world as a leader in
pollution reduction, another intangible benefit.
The benefits to society are: reduced impact to
recreation, tourist locations, and individual lifestyles. In
addition, fishing industries should be less threatened from
oil spill disasters.
In summary, the costs and benefits for the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 are quite numerous and significant to
industry, the government and society. To aid in the analysis,
an effectiveness evaluation for the double hull requirement is





The Act establishes new standards for double-hull
tankers. Except as provided by certain sections of the Act,
a vessel with a single hull may not operate after 1 January
2010, when operating on the waters subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States. This requirement has many costs that
are of significance.
Initially, there are the research and development
costs to be incurred by the shipowner and by the shipyard.
Next, the investment costs are a significant element in the
costs of the new regulation. These costs include the shipyard
bill for construction or retrofit (including material, labor,
overhead (e.g., utilities, taxes, watchmen) and profit) and
other shipowner costs, such as training, legal fees, etc.
[Ref. 32:pp. 32,53,55]. These cost elements are explained in
the following paragraphs.
The costs for a design change will "differ according
to whether construction or alterations will be performed in a
U.S. or foreign shipyard. . .any cost estimate must be
predicated on an assumption concerning the country the work
will be done in" [Ref. 32: p. 54]. In addition, the same
design change will differ in cost depending on the location
within the U.S.. The "cost of shipbuilding on the West Coast
exceeds that on the East Coast by approximately 3-1/2
percent .. .the cost of shipbuilding on the East Coast exceeds
that on the Gulf Coast by approximately 2-1/2 percent" [Ref.
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32:p. 54]. In addition, there are many different shipbuilding
and repair estimating procedures utilized; ship cost
estimation is "often characterized as a "black box"
science. .. (in the U.S. there are almost as many ways of
estimating ship construction costs as there are shipyards"
[Ref. 32: p. 54].
The costs for a design change can vary depending on
when in the life of a ship it is done. Typically, the earlier
in the life of the ship the change is made the less expensive
the change will be. Obviously it is cheaper to incorporate a
change into a vessel on order than one that is under
construction; "retrofitting is, on average 75 percent more
expensive" [Ref. 32:p. 57].
There are many operating cost changes associated with
going from a single to a double bottomed vessel. For example,
the "increased structural complexity may make overall repair
costs more costly" [Ref. 32:p. 58].
Personnel costs will also be affected by this design
change. Because "double bottom vessels increase the risk of
explosion (due to the accumulation of gases in the void spaces
of the double hull, which may explode) and, hence, danger to
the crew. .
.
(consequently) the maritime unions may bargain for
an increase in wages for crew members" [Ref. 32 :p. 58] [Ref.
33:p. 44].
Insurance premiums may be affected by the design
change. Premiums could decrease because "double hulls are
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expected to decrease collision damage and resulting oil
spills. . .
.
(but) double hulls also may increase the probability
of vessel explosions and crew danger" [Ref. 32: p. 59] thereby
cancelling the decrease.
The cargo carrying capacity of the vessel could change
due to the design change, because the double hull replaces
fuel storage space [Ref. 32 :p. 60]. Additional repair parts
could be required because of the increased structural
complexity [Ref. 32:p. 58, 60]. In addition, the new vessel
design regulation could "necessitate crew drills or crew
attendance at certain training institutions" [Ref. 32 :p. 60].
Moreover, the administrative cost of increased paperwork must
be accounted for (i.e., to monitor the added requirements for
repair parts, training, drills) [Ref 32:p. 60].
When a vessel makes a special trip to a shipyard or
extends its stay at a shipyard for equipment installation,
this "time lost to productive uses represents a real cost to
the owner in addition to the shipyard or manufacturer cost of
installation" [Ref. 32:p. 62]. On the market, demurrage
costs per day can vary from $8,875 for a 55,000 DWT tanker to
$85,000 for a 390,000 DWT tanker [Ref. 32: pp. 59,60,86].
These values provide a measure of the potential loss from not
having that vessel operating.
The identified costs due to the requirement for
double hulls from the Act are quite large. However, when
compared to typical legal claims from spills, there is a definite
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incentive to reduce spills. For example, in 1990 dollars,
claims approximated "$2800 per ton of oil spilled. The
startling exception is the Exxon Valdez case, in which costs
could reach $90,000 per ton" [Ref. 6:p. 156]. In addition,
clean up costs can range up to $38,000 per ton [Ref. 6:p.
160].
Additional requirements from the Act, and their
impact, are as follows. New tank level or pressure monitoring
devices to ensure people are warned of impending accidents are
necessary. This could result in considerable expense to
industry due to the large numbers of individual tanks
(typically between ten and twenty) on each tanker.
In addition, tank vessel manning has many new
restrictions; i.e., licensed seamen are not permitted to work
more than 14 hours in any 24 hours or more than 35 hours in
any 72 hour period, except in an emergency or drill.
Depending on how current ships and schedules are established,
this could result in additional manning for ships (for better
safety), but also higher costs to the industry.
New minimum standards for plating thickness and
periodic gauging of the plating thickness of vessels are to be
established which allow vessels to continue to operate. These
will result in considerable costs to the industry for
compliance, especially if the tankers do not meet the minimum
standards of thickness currently.
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Government costs, due to this Act, are also
substantial. As a result of this Act, new inspection
requirements have been established for skimmers, booms, and
vessels, and new requirements for unannounced drills are to be
established. New regulations will establish expanded or
improved vessel traffic service systems on the U.S. navigable
waters to reduce the risks of collisions, spills, and damage
associated with that traffic. This will require additional
government funding, manpower and documentation.
The Act has required a study to be conducted to
evaluate the adequacy of qualifications and training of crew
members on tankers, and their ability to prevent or remove a
discharge of oil from their tankers. Additional study
requirements include: evaluate the adequacy of navigation
equipment and electronic means of position reporting and
identification of tankers, and evaluate the adequacy of
navigation procedures under different operating conditions,
including variables such as: speed, daylight, ice, tides,
weather and other conditions. These requirements will
necessitate more government funds.
The Act requires a government study to determine
whether tank liners or other secondary means of containment
should be used to prevent leaking. In addition, the
government is required to conduct a study to ensure that
tankers are equipped with proper communication capabilities.
Again, government funding is required to support the study.
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The government is required to monitor and approve the
new guidelines for the area contingency plans (currently, each
fueling location is required to have contingency plans
developed, in case of a spill (i.e., how they will react,
clean it up) ; the new Act provides for stricter guidelines for
the plans). This will require government funds.
New regulations for foreign tank vessels have been
established. The need to periodically evaluate the manning,
training, qualification, and watchkeeping standards of a
foreign vessel to ensure they are at least equivalent to
United States law, or international standards accepted by the
United States, has been mandated to allow the foreign vessel
to operate in U.S. navigable waters. These requirements will
require substantial government resources, i.e., manpower and
documentation, to monitor.
New regulations on criminal record reviews, and
licensing or certification of registry holders are mandated,
requiring government funding. New alcohol and drug testing
requirements have also been established.
B. EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION
The double hull requirement (in addition to the other
requirements of the Act) will cost industry money, which will
"ultimately be borne by the consumer" [Ref. 33 :p. 61] in
paying at the pump (or via taxes to fund the new government
requirements). However, in attempting to reduce spills, "on
the basis of cost-effectiveness the double hull is among the
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best values. ... (ultimately) when they are fully phased in,
double hull tankers will cost about $700 million per year, or
about one or two cents per gallon of gas at the pump" [Ref.
6:p. 13]. From this nominal cost, double hulls should help
prevent the spill of "between 3000 and 5000 tons of oil into
the ocean each year" [Ref. 6:p. 13]. They "offer the greatest
potential for tank penetration reductions" [Ref. 34:p. 39].
Table XI provides an in-depth effectiveness evaluation
which identifies the relative impacts that tankers with and
without double hulls will have on industry, government and
society.
In the evaluation, the "Weights" (W) were subjectively
assigned by the author (a certified Fuel Intern of Naval
Supply Center, Charleston, South Carolina and a former
Petroleum Officer of the Naval Base, Rota, Spain) based on a
group discussion (the group consisted of three personnel,
including another certified Fuel Intern) during a Policy
Analysis course, MN414 5, project, at the Naval Postgraduate
School. These weights identify the relative importance that
each characteristic has on industry, government or society.
The sum total of the weights equals 100. In addition, the
"Relative Importance/Capability" (S) values were also
subjectively assigned, (in the same manner as the "Weights")
identifying the relative impact a tanker, with or without a
double hull, has on the denoted characteristic. Each of these
factors, (S) and (W) , were then multiplied to obtain the
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product "WxS". The sums of "WxS" for tankers with or without
double hulls identify the relative impacts on government,











1 20 DECREASE SPILLS 20 15
2 18
DECREASE































SIJM (W) = IOC) SUM (W X S) = 1396 772
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Consequently, tankers with double hulls (WxS sum = 1396)
are significantly (81%) more important than tankers without
double hulls (WxS sum = 772) for society, government and
industry as a whole.
The maximum constraint for each (S) value is determined by
the weight (W) for each characteristic, and the minimum value
for any (S) is zero. This procedure was also part of the
course content of MN4145. Consequently, the (S) value can
fall anywhere between zero and the weight value. For example,
in item #1, the maximum value for (S) is 20, (the weight for
the "decrease spills" characteristic) while the minimum the
(S) value can be is zero.
A full explanation for each (S) and (W) value is hereby
provided:
ITEM 1 . For Item 1, (a very critical item, therefore it
received a high value for (W) of 20) , tankers with double
hulls (S = 20) will decrease spills more than tankers without
double hulls (S = 15) . As identified previously, double hulls
should preclude between 3000 to 5000 tons of oil from being
spilled annually.
ITEM 2 . Tankers with double hulls (S = 18) will allow for
less product loss than tankers without double hulls (S =
13) . The (W) value is important, but not as critical as
item 1, therefore the value 18 is assigned.
ITEM 3-5 . Because of less product loss (as noted for Item
1) tankers with double hulls will promote a cleaner
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environment (S = 10) , and provide less impacts to the fishing
industry (S = 6) and tourist/recreation facilities (S = 6)
than tankers without double hulls (S = 7,4,4 respectively).
For item 3, the (W) value is less significant than for items
(1-2) , but more critical than items (4) and (5) ; the (W)
values of 10, 6, 6 were therefore assigned, respectively.
ITEM 6 . Less product loss will allow the United States to
become a better leader in pollution reduction, if double hulls
exist in tankers (S = 5) than if tankers do not have double
hulls' (S = 3)
.
For items (6) and (9) , the weight is the least critical of
all assigned, consequently a value of 5 is utilized.
ITEM 7 . Having less product loss results in fewer legal
encounters, thus double hull tankers have a much higher "S"
value (of 15) vice tankers without double hulls (S = 3) . This
has a significant impact to the stockholders with tankers
having double hulls.
ITEM 8 . Providing less product loss will promote better
public relations for industry; thus, "S" is substantially
higher for tankers with double hulls (of 15) than tankers
without double hulls (S = 4) . This item is also very critical
to the stockholders with double-hull tankers.
Both items (7) and (8) are highly critical characteristics,
thus they were given a high weight of (W = 15)
.
ITEM 9 . Lastly, the government will have a stronger con-
trol over industry, by imposing the double-hull requirement
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(S = 5) . Government will show its lack of control of industry
if double hulls do not exist (S = 0)
.
Consequently, a substantially higher effectiveness for all
of the characteristics (Items 1-9) can be obtained by the
addition of the minimal/negligible increase in cost (in fact
the cost can almost be considered fixed) for double hulls.
The conclusion that can be reached from this analysis is that
for the small cost of one or two cents per gallon, a marked
increase for many beneficial factors/characteristics can be
obtained by having double hulls vice not having double hulls.
C. SUMMARY
The impact of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 is quite
significant. When fully in effect (i.e., by the year 2010 for
the double hull requirement, etc.) the environment should have
a reduced potential and occurrence of spills, aiding man's
persistent quest to live in harmony with nature. The risk of
spills cannot be eliminated in total, but reducing it to a
level acceptable to society [Ref. 6:p. 35], within the
economical and technological bounds of man, is a constant goal
for which we must, and never should, stop striving for. In
addition, opportunity costs must continually be evaluated to
ensure industry does not expend an excess amount of money on
oil spill prevention and innovative cleanup procedures, and
neglect more critical global petroleum concerns, such as
locating petroleum sources.
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This Act and the initiatives identified in Chapter V are
intended to aid in oil spill reduction. However, new
developments, alternatives and ideas must continue, and be
implemented, as is economically feasible, to ensure oil spills
are kept to a realistic and acceptable minimum.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
Providing a safe, acceptable method of petroleum
transportation, and ensuring the environment is as well
protected as is technologically and economically feasible, is
highly critical. As identified, the safe transportation of
liquid petroleum shows a track record that has been improving.
And, when spills do occur the capability for cleanup is
constantly getting better. To put the movement of liquid
petroleum into a realistic perspective: oil spill damage is
not as "bad" as the media typically portrays.
"It has been assumed that oil spills are the inevitable
price which must te paid for an advanced civilization" [Ref.
2:p. 3-1]. But, with the efforts of industry and government,
many actions have been taken to decrease these undesirable
events. With the Strike Teams, the Co-ops, the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990, the future MRSC, and the many new industrial
programs underway (i.e., new skimmers, new barges, new
liners) , not only should oil spills continue to decrease in
the future due to better prevention procedures, but their
environmental impacts should also be minimized due to
technologically more advanced cleanup methods.
The time may come when oil will be replaced by other
energy sources, but in today's demanding society, where
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millions of gallons of fuel, of all various types, are moved
each day, the current number of spills needs to be labeled
acceptable due to man's present capabilities. One must also
keep in mind that for any oil spill, "the forces of nature
determine the success or failure of a cleanup. . .winds, tides
temperature, location, and luck are irreducible factors" [Ref
.
9:p. 69]. Technology for prevention and cleanup is a major
part of the solution. But a "realistic assessment of what is
and what is not a true environmental hazard" [Ref. 7: p. 661]
needs to be addressed. As has been noted in Chapter II, the
environment has a way of taking care of its own. As it comes
from the earth, oil also returns, with a negligible long term
effect. Consequently, sound policies, in addition to a solid
perspective, need to be maintained on spills and their impact.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Industry and government need to continue efforts in spill
reduction, prevention and cleanup. When the Oil Pollution Act
of 1990 is implemented in full, it will provide an effective
impact in reducing spills. The MSRC needs to become a
reality to provide additional safety to the environment.
Continual research in oil spill cleanup and prevention needs
to persist, as is technologically and economically feasible.
Increased efforts need to be made on tanker design,
compartment size, and vacuum tank systems to ensure the least
amount of oil is spilled when an accident occurs. Assessments
on current training practices need to be continually reviewed
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and enhanced when necessary. Safety practices in all oil
operations must be continually stressed and reviewed to ensure
safe vessel passage. In addition, future waterway structures
need to be examined and analyzed fully, to provide the least
accident-prone environment.
Consequently, although much has been and is being done for
oil spill prevention and cleanup, efforts must not slow.
Emphasis in this all-important aspect of petroleum movement
must never take a back-seat position. Progress is being made
and must continue.
Is "enough" being done to protect the environment (as the
title of this paper asks)? Obviously this is a judgement
call. "Enough" environmental protection may not be attained
until zero spills occur, but technologically and economically
this is a hurdle of immense proportions. It has been assessed
that "a reduction of oil pollution to zero was impossible if
oil was to continue to be transported by water" [Ref. 33 :p.
53]. Consequently, efforts must continue in this critical
aspect of petroleum management to ensure the highest potential
caliber of petroleum movement safety, to provide the highest
possible protection to the environment. This should result in
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